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Content of presentation 
I Puzzle, research question and methodology  
I Theoretical considerations: the politics of Minimum 
Income Scheme-reforms (MIS) 
I The Austrian MIS-reform: development & explaining 
factors 
I Agenda Setting (1995-2006) 
I Formation and Decision (2006-2010) 
I Implementation (2010-2015) 
I Re-negotiation (2015-2016) 
I Preliminary Conclusions 
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Puzzle, research question and methodology 
I Needs-oriented Minimum Security: Austria a ‘deviant case’?!  
I Initial agenda: emphasis on poverty reduction, not workfare. 
I Long-reform trajectory with janus-faced agreement between Federal  
Republic and provinces in 2010 
I deterioration when compared to original plans,  
I but still with substantial expansion of client’s rights. 
I Failed negations on extension/renewal of the agreement in 2016 and 
subsequent cuts at the provincial level.   
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Puzzle, research question and methodology 
I What factors explain  
I the initial ‘poverty reduction’ proposal (contradicting international 
reform trends), 
I the mitigated – but still expansive – agreement on co-ordination of 
MIS schemes in 2010 (irrespective of rising demand and 
comparatively tight public budgets),   
I the turn towards explicit cutbacks and retrenchment as from 2015 
(irrespective of austerity not dominating debates and reform 
proposals in other policy areas). 
 Process tracing: 10 years of reform debates and four years of 
negotiations, and six years of implementation and re-negotiations. 
 Contribution to the general understanding of ‘politics of MIS-reforms’  
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Theoretical considerations for minimum income reforms  
I Functionalism: need and financial costs; the role of austerity 
I Ideas: between ‘poverty’ and ‘perversity’ 
I Partisan Politics and Power Resources: (note: MIS-recipients make up 
for a low share of electorate) 
I Social democrats: national regulation  
(insider/outsider representation and credit claiming/blame avoidance) 
I Conservatives: male breadwinner and subsidiarity (charity)  
I Liberal: market and residual safety net  
I Radical right: only deserving (citizenship, age, …) 
I Party competition and opposition/government role 




Theoretical considerations for minimum income reforms  
I Institutions:  
I federal system with veto points and veto players,  
I path dependency versus innovation 
I Individual agency: policy entrepreneur (coalition magnet) 




Major features of the Austrian setting  
I Rising need and comparatively mild direct impact of the so-called financial 
and economic crisis (2008-2010) 
I Interests: 
I Strong right wing party (FPÖ, BZÖ) 
I Social democrats tied to trade unions 
I Strong conservative party (on federal and provincial level) 
I Institutions:  
I Unemployment insurance: Federal Republic; unemployment benefit; 
unemployment assistance (income test, no minimum). 
I Social assistance: nine provincial regulations, de facto local discretion in 
implementation, strict means-test, conditionality (‘self-help’).  
I Financing: ‘Financial equalisation pact’ between provinces and Federal 
Republic  cost and problem shifting. 
I Treaty between provinces and the Federal Republic, Art. 15a (2010) 
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Needs-Oriented Minimum Security:  
agenda setting 
Phase First initiatives Contested political terrain  
Period 1995-2000 2000-2006 
Idea Poverty Poverty, perversity 
Needs/Costs Rising, cost containment Rising, cost containment 
Government SPÖ/ÖVP: committee ÖVP/FPÖ: shift to provinces, workfare 
Opposition Liberal Forum, Green Party Liberal Forum & Green Party 
SPÖ: needs-oriented basic security  
Provinces cost containment/activation Reform oriented; in opposition to 
governmental plan  
Social partner - Without strong position 
Civil Society Strong alliance, proposal of 
basic income  
Strong alliance 
Entrepreneur - Erwin Buchinger (SPÖ) 
green: pro progressive reform, red: against  
S 9 
Needs-Oriented Minimum Security:  
formation and decision making 
Phase Window of opportunity Concessions and limited reform  
Period 2006-2008 2008-2010 
Idea Poverty Poverty, Perversity, activation 
Needs/Costs Rising Rising, ‘financial & economic crisis’ 
Government SPÖ: core project  
ÖVP: acceptance 
SPÖ: important, workfare/cost containm. 
ÖVP: workfare/cost-containment  
Opposition Green Party: support  Green Party: weaker support; no core project 
anymore. 
FPÖ: benefit fraud 
Provinces Cost-shift, against one-stop-
shop (veto player)      
Cost-shift, lowest common denominator  
Social partner Trade union: in favour Trade union: little support,  
Employer’s organization: ‘work must pay off’ 
(‘wmpo’)/adverse incentives  
Civil Society Strong support Topic looses ground  
Entrepreneur Erwin Buchinger; Minister for 
Social Affairs 
None (Rudolf Hundstorfer as Minister after 
snap elections) 
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Needs-Oriented Minimum Security:  
formation and decision making 
Phase Implementation Re-negotiaton 
Period 2010-2015 2015-2016 
Idea Poverty, Perversity, activation (Poverty), Perversity, activation, welfare 
chauvinism 
Needs/Costs Rising Rising, cost-containment   
Government SPÖ: in favour of 2010 agreement 
ÖVP: ‘wmpo’ 
SPÖ: in favour of 2010 agreement 
ÖVP: ‘wmpo’ & welfare chauvinism 
Opposition FPÖ: ‘benefit fraud’ & welfare 
chauvinism 
Green Party: Criticizing 
weaknesses of 2010 agreement 
FPÖ: welfare chauvinism 
Green Party: Defending 2010 agreement; no 
core project  
Provinces Implementing 2010 agreement; 
mixed signals 
First reforms violating the 2010 agreement; 
‘wmpo’, welfare chauvinism, no consensus 
on renewed agreement, “Red” Vienna 
apposed to cuts 
Social partner Trade unions: non-issue 
Employer organizations: wmpo 
Trade unions: non-issue 
Employer organizations: non-issue (?)  
Civil Society Criticizing weaknesses of 2010 
agreement 
Defending 2010 agreement 
Entrepreneur None None 
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Discussion 
I Politics of MIS reform are complex, driven by a multitude of different 
factors. 
I Functionalist approaches (i.e. focussing on demand, economic 
conditions, budgetary constraints, austerity etc. ) fall short in 
explaining related developments. 
I MIS-reform is an immanent political issue. 
I Progressive MIS-reform is rather unlikely/difficult, because 
‘structurally’ limited responsiveness of politics to needs/demands of 
MIS-recipients: rather small share of electorate; Social Democrats & 
trade unions: insider/outsider issues. 
I Positions on favour of cuts/retrenchment get momentum when 
‘arguments’ of ‘work must pay off’, cost containment etc. get combined 




But to be not too pessimistic… : 
 
I Progressive MIS-reform is premised on/possible in case of: 
I Favourable framing = ‘poverty’  (in Austria: driven by civil society & some 
opposition parties)    
I Favourable institutional setting (in the Austrian case: credit-claiming of 
Social Democrats in opposition/changing to government, opportunity for 
cost-shifting for provinces). 
I  Individual agency: policy entrepreneurs acting a as coalition magnet. 
